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ETHICS WITHOUT ERRORS 
James Lenman 
NOTE: This is my version of a paper published in Ratio 26, 2013, pp. 391-409. Please 
always refer to the version  published there if citing or quoting.  
 
ABSTRACT: I argue against the claim that we should adopt a moral error theory. The 
intelligibility of our moral practice need offer no questionable metaphysical hostages 
to fortune. The two most credible policy recommendations that might follow from 
moral error theory, abolitionism and prescriptive fictionalism, are not very credible.1 
 
1.  
Was it morally wrong for my country, along with others, to invade Iraq in 2003? 
More generally, when is it morally wrong to go to war? Is anything it would be 
appropriate to describe as terrorism ever morally acceptable? More generally still, in 
what circumstances is it morally acceptable for people to kill or attempt to kill other 
people? Should we ever consider it morally permissible or even perhaps morally 
FRPSXOVRU\WRNLOODSHUVRQIRUWKDWSHUVRQ¶VRZQJRRGWRHDVHWKHLUpain perhaps? Is 
this a moral possibility even in some circumstances where the person does not consent 
to being killed? Should it cause us moral concern that some are rich and others are 
poor?If I am rich and you are poor is it morally wrong for me not to give you some of 
my wealth? Is it ever morally OK for others, governments perhaps, to compel me to 
do so? What forms of discrimination on grounds of race or sex are morally 
acceptable? In what circumstances, might we have moral reasons to think the 
punishment given to a wrongdoer is too harsh? Or too lenient? Is monogamy morally 
preferable to other conjugal arrangements or is that just a conservative moral 
prejudice? Is it morally wrong to fantasize about performing acts such as rape that it 
would certainly be morally wrong to perform? Is it morally wrong for pornography to 
facilitate such fantasies by explicit simulations of such actions. Is every kind of 
pornography morally wrong?  
It would be simple enough if moral questions such as these were 
straightforwardly empirical questions but they do not seem to be. Of course empirical 
questions about the natural world and moral questions are highly mutually entangled. 
In complex and numerous ways empirical questions are very relevant to moral 
questions. Does the prevalence of pornography have harmful social effects? How 
effective at controlling crime are highly punitive systems of criminal law? What is a 
given military intervention likely to achieve? Such questions of relevance are 
themselves often thick with ethical presupposition. For a pure retributivist, questions 
about the deterrent effects of harsh punishments may be neither here nor there. If we 
are persuaded that the right to discontinue a pregnancy is closely analogous in its 
grounds to the right to sever an uninvited bodily connection with a famous violinist, it 
would not be very relevant to the issue of abortion rights how different a foetus at 
various stages in its development is to a famous violinist. On other understandings of 
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 Some of the material in this paper FRPHVIURPDQLQDXJXUDOOHFWXUH³0DNLQJ(WKFV,QWHOOLJLEOH´WKDW,
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these issues, the latter may matter a great deal. Someone who conducts lethal 
experiments on rabbits might seek to defend what she does by appealing to the 
benefits that arise from the ensuing gains in medical knowledge. If someone who does 
this on unwilling human subjects and seeks to justify their conduct in a similar way, 
most of us will think that, even in attempting this, he is misunderstanding the gravity 
of what he is doing. 
I certainly think this. You might disagree. And it is very hard to see how we 
might, say, design an experiment that would determine which of us was right. At a 
higher level of theoretical generality, it is to a great extent, an empirical question what 
PDNHVIRUKXPDQKDSSLQHVVRUZHOOEHLQJEXWLW¶VQRWDWDOOREYLRXVO\DQHPSLULFDO
question whether happiness and wellbeing are, in the last analysis, all that matters, 
morally speaking (as many people have contended as and many others have denied.) 
(Cf. Lenman (2013))  
If moral questions are not, or not simply, empirical questions about the natural 
world, an obvious next thought is to wonder if perhaps they are questions about some 
RWKHUGRPDLQRIUHDOLW\RXWVLGHWKHQDWXUDOZRUOGSHUKDSVDWKHRORJLFDORQH,W¶VUDWKHU
questionable of course that reality has any such domain. But perhaps it is a matter of 
some moral urgency that we should believe it does. In debates about theism we often 
encounter the thought that we need God to somehow shore morality up with the 
authority he alone is able to invest in it. If God is dead, we are invited to fear, 
everything is permitted. And the thought is usually presented precisely as something 
to be feared, something threatening, not as something liberating and welcome. If God 
is dead, everything is permitted. And that would be just awful. Sometimes indeed this 
is presented as an argument for the retention of religious belief: we should continue to 
belief in God to avert the catastrophe of making nonsense of ethics that would follow 
from disbelief.  
Of course this is not a good argument. The standard response is the so-called 
Euthyphro Dilemma. Does God, the Dilemma asks us, issue the moral commands he 
does for some good reasons? If not, his commands seem simply arbitrary. If so, then it 
is surely those reasons, and not his commands, that provide the fundamental source of 
the authority of moral norms. HHUH¶VDGLIIHUHQWZD\WRFRPHDWHVVHQWLDOO\WKHVDPH
thought. Just why, it is illuminating to ask, would it be a catastrophe if all the moral 
constraints and demands we take to apply to us were to be undermined in this way, 
just why would the loss of morality count as a real loss? If there is some reason to 
think it would, it is either a reason that is independent of the truth of theism or it is 
not. If the reason to think losing morality would be catastrophic is a reason 
LQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHWUXWKRIWKHLVPWKHQZHVXUHO\GRQ¶WQHHGWKHLVPWRDYRLG
catastrophe. For any consideration that provided us with a reason to think the 
discrediting of moral norms would be a catastrophe is likely also to provide us with a 
reason to value, respect and retain these very norms. Whereas if the only reason we 
had to think losing morality would be catastrophic itself derived from the importance 
*RG¶VZLOOKDVEHVWRZHGRQLWDQ\DUJXPHQWIRUWKHLVPWKDWDSSHDOHGto that 
LPSRUWDQFHZRXOGVLPSO\EHJWKHTXHVWLRQ1RWRQO\ZRXOG*RG¶VGHPLVHPHDQWKDW
what would otherwise be forbidden was suddenly permitted, it would also mean that 
what would otherwise be a catastrophe was in fact no catastrophe at all.  
This sort of thing is always happening. We are presented with some 
metaphysical proposition P and we are told that if P is false morality would be made a 
nonsense and that would be just terrible. So we really must believe P is true. P might 
be ± and often is - the truth of theism or it might be ± and often is -  some extravagant 
proposition about the metaphysics of free will. The question we need to ask here is 
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why it would be terrible if we made nonsense of ethics. For I agree that it would be 
terrible to make nonsense of ethics but I think that getting clear why it would be 
terrible is exactly what we need to do to make sense of ethics. And when we do this 
we often discover that we have really no need of P to make all the sense as we need. 
For, after all, the thought that losing ethics would be a terrible thing is already an 
ethical thought. The argument that only belief in P sustains ethics and so we had 
better believe it is thus always suspect. 
Ethics is often situated outside the domain of the natural but in ways that make 
no reference to theology. Here the big picture of moral philosophy takes on a shape 
that is a commonplace of contemporary philosophy. Some central element of our 
thought such as ethical values, numbers or thoughts can start to look philosophically 
problematic. How on earth, people have wondered, could the natural world, the 
empirical world studied by science possibly incorporate, for example, numbers? If we 
are to believe physicists, the stuff that comprises the natural world is made out of 
atoms but abstract things like numbers surely cannot be made out of atoms. They just 
GRQ¶WORRNOLNHWKH\ILWDVSDUWRIWKHQDWXUDOZRUOG$QGOLNHZLVHLWLVVRPHWLPHV
argued, with conscious thought and with ethics. So we get a bunch of people, dualists 
about the mind, Platonists about numbers, nonnaturalists about ethics who say, OK, 
these things are not part of the natural empirical world but the natural empirical world 
LVQRWDOOWKHUHLV7KHUH¶VDQRWKHUGRPDLQWKHGRPDLQRIQXPEHUVSHUKDSVRUWKH
domain of ethical truth, that is not part of the natural order of causally interacting 
physical things, but somehow separate from it. Then there are other people who say, 
no this sort of nonnaturalist view is just incredible; after all, if truths about, say, 
numbers or ethical values really were so divorced from the natural world at which our 
empirical experience is directed, then it starts to look very mysterious how we know 
about them, how we can speak about them and indeed why we should care about 
them. So some persevere in trying to find something in the natural world with which 
to identify such truths. Others still explore anti-realist possibilities, some of which 
may simply reject the domain of discourse in question, while others may seek 
deflationary understandings of it that render it metaphysically innocuous. 
Is there a domain of nonnatural ethical facts? One good objection to 
nonnaturalism it that it makes it so hard to understand how we could ever know. But 
SHUKDSVWKHUHLV2USHUKDSVWKHUHLVQRW,GRQ¶W much care. And nor should you. 
Suppose you believed there were sentences written on the sky that said, 'RQ¶WNLOO, 
'RQ¶WVWHDO, etc.. Then you might think the prohibition of these things drew its 
DXWKRULW\IURPWKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHVHVHQWHQFHV%XW\RX¶GEe wrong. After all, suppose 
we discovered there were sentences written in the sky that said the opposite of these 
things. Do kill, Do steal, etc. would we then think it was OK or indeed desirable to do 
these things. No, we would (at least if we had any sense) think, how odd, there appear 
to be some rather obnoxious and stupid sentences written in the sky and we would 
take no further notice of them.   
Consider those facts the relating of which comprises the historical narrative of 
the Nazi Holocaust. And imagine, or try to imagine, a world in which these very same 
things occur exactly as they did in ours: the planning, the preparation, the pain, the 
suffering, the killing, all that and everything else exactly as it actually unfolded. Only 
imagine, please, one tiny difference. In our world it is a nonnatural fact that those who 
planned and executed all this did something wrong. In this world it is not. In this 
world the nonnatural facts are somehow inverted. Planning and executing all this 
morally permissible, perhaps even morally admirable. You can try conceiving of this 
but I do not think you will succeed. Nothing about any supposed nonnatural moral 
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facts could conceivably subtract from the wickedness of the Holocaust and no less 
plausibly nothing about such fDFWVFRXOGFRQWULEXWHWRLWHLWKHU7KDW¶VZK\,GRQ¶W
UHDOO\FDUHDERXWQRQQDWXUDOPRUDOIDFWVDQGZK\,GRQ¶WEX\LQWRWKHLGHDWKDW
morality has anything to do with them.  
Say this and once again the pessimistic alarm bell is sounded. Morality only 
makes sense, we are sometimes told, if we accept that these nonnatural facts obtain. 
Give up on them and we give up on morality itself and that would be awful. And 
again I think we need to be told what we be so awful about it. Perhaps it would be 
awful because we have some reason to value morality, reasons having nothing to do 
with all this hocus-pocus about nonnatural facts. And if we have such a reason, 
morality is not threatened by giving up the hocus-pocus. So again we should not be 
troubled by the pessimistic alarm bell. (Cf. Lenman (2009)) 
  
2 
Now here is a thought. Perhaps the pessimistic alarm bell is not so pessimistic. 
Perhaps the loss of morality would not be a loss at all but a liberation. For perhaps 
morality is not just metaphysically suspect. Perhaps it is also a bit rubbish. Rubbish 
we would be better off without. Many people baulk at this proposal. Nonetheless the 
fact remains that others have sought to place the abolition of morality in a more 
attractive light. Prominent recent so-called moral abolitionists include Ian Hinckfuss 
(1987), Richard Garner (1994) and Joel Marks (2013). We can go a long way in 
sympathizing with much of what such writers say. Morality, after all, is what makes 
us, all too often, priggish, sanctimonious, censorious, prudish, punitive, pompous, 
mean-spirited, fanatical and cruel. The sort of pious and censorious professional 
EXV\ERGLHV%XUQVFDOOHGWKH³8QFR*XLG´DUHQRWSDUWLFXODUO\QLFHSHRSOH³2K\H
ZKDDUHVDHJXLG\RXUVHOI6DHSLRXVDQGVDHKRO\<H¶YHQRXJKWWR do but mark and 
WHOO<RXU1HHERXUVIDXWVDQGIROO\«´,QGHHGWKHVRUWRISHRSOH5XVVHOOLQDVSOHQGLG
HVVD\RIWKDWWLWOHFDOOHG³1LFH3HRSOH´DUHRIWHQQRWYHU\QLFHSHRSOH ³7KHHVVHQFHRI
nice people is that they hate life as manifested in tendencies to cooperation, in the 
boisterousness of children, and above all in sex, with the thought of which they are 
REVHVVHG´2. We have all met our fair share of pursed lipped prigs and professional 
offence-takers, people whose favourite emotion is moral outrage, travelling through 
life looking for things of which to disapprove. Such people plausibly do much harm. 
Indeed as Roy Baumeister vividly documents in his book Evil: Inside Human Cruelty 
and Violence (1997, esp. chapter 6), while a fair share of human evildoing has its 
roots in sadism or, unscrupulous greed, an awful lot of it originates in moral idealism. 
The relatively small-time evildoing of the Gordon Gekkos and Hannibal Lecters of 
this world can seem rather modest when compared to the havoc that results from the 
moral zealotry of a Maximilien Robespierre or an Osama Bin Laden, RIKLVWRU\¶V
moral fanatics, the people who gave us the Inquisition, the Terror, the Cultural 
Revolution, the Gulag, the Killing Fields, the Red Army Faction and the Taliban. 
Vicious people can sometimes be a little scary, for sure, but it is the virtuous who 
should really scare the crap out of us.  
The trouble is of course that when someone condemns morality for making us 
priggish, sanctimonious, censorious, prudish, punitive, pompous, mean-spirited, 
fanatical and cruel she is engaged in a familiar activity with a familiar name. She is 
moralizing. It makes sense to dislike these things and it makes sense to recognize that 
they can all at least wear the front of morality and that vile things are done in the 
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 Russell (1957). The quoted sentence is from the closing paragraph. 
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name of moral ideals. But that is not a good objection to morality any more than the 
existence of bad music is a good reason to dislike music or the fact that sexual desire 
can lead people to do dreadful things is a good reason to view human sexuality quote 
generally with fear or disapproval. Rather it is an objection to bad morals and to the 
stupid, twisted and pathological forms that moral motivation, like any kind of 
motivation, can sometimes take. It may sometimes favour reform but it hardly favours 
abolition. This is particularly clear when we think of those aspects of our moral 
thinking and practice that most often trouble the liberal-minded, the often very 
punitive ways in which we deal with moral transgression, the whole, often rather 
horrible, conceptual apparatus of guilt, blame and desert, of the more negative 
reactive attitudes and the retributive behaviours that come in their wake. There is 
much to criticize here but it is a critique that makes most sense when presented, as it 
often is3, as a critique from within morality, not as a repudiation of morality itself. 
A few years ago, I listened to a radio debate4 in which Mark Oaten, one time 
Libdem frontbencher, boldly and controversially announced that he would defend the 
bold and controversial proposition that we should abolish prisons, a proposition so 
bold and controversial, he told us, that it was only since leaving the front benches that 
he felt able to advance it at all. Prisons, he told us, should be abolished and replaced 
with a new range of tools for dealing with criminality more suited to the twenty-first 
century. But any inclination one may have had to be impressed at the bold and 
controversial character of it all rather evaporated when it became clear that this new 
range of tools would include special buildings with locks on the doors and guards 
where people with a history of criminal behaviour would spend periods of involuntary 
confinement. But they would not be prisons, certainly not, detention centres please. In 
like ways, the moral abolitionist is surely either not thinking clearly or having us on.  
Perhaps I do the abolitionist too little credit. Perhaps he means it. But what would 
meaning it involve? There are many vexed and controversial moral questions. I began 
by listing some. But there are many that are not controversial. How willing would you 
be to agree to live in a society where murder was simply OK? How willing would you 
be to agree to live in a society where any appeal in any context to considerations of 
fairness and justice was simply not recognized as carrying any kind of rational force? 
Some people might be willing to agree to all these things and people like that might 
EHVHULRXVPRUDODEROLWLRQLVWV%XW,¶PQRWZLOOLQJWRDFFHSWWKHVHWKLQJV$QGQeither 
are you. 
 Neither in fact are actual philosophical so-called abolitionists, at least those I 
have mentioned, who tend in practice to be very much the sort of people we would all 
welcome as next-door neighbours. Thus Garner and Marks repudiate morality but not 
what they call ethics and Garner in particular, who has defended what he calls 
amoralism at the greatest length, defends what is in effect a virtue-focused ethics that 
emphasizes and commends the cultivation harmony, honesty, compassion and respect 
IRUWKHQDWXUDOZRUOG,GRQ¶WP\VHOIILQGLW helpful to call this amoralism at all. But to 
the extent that all that is proposed is to throw out a certain amount of metaphysical 
baggage, along perhaps with certain aspects of our moral thought that might not bear 
moral scrutiny, my disagreement is largely verbal and not metaethical.  
7KHZRUGµPRUDO¶LVQRWafter all such a big deal. Look again at the opening 
SDUDJUDSKRIWKLVSDSHU7KHZRUGVµPRUDO¶DQGµPRUDOO\¶RFFXUWKHUHWLPHV%XW
they are pretW\LQHVVHQWLDO,¶PKDSS\HQRXJKWRHGLWWKHPDZD\%XWWKHTXHVWLRQV
                                                 
3
 See e.g. Kelly (2002)2¶1HLOO(2011), Parfit, (2011), chapter  11.  
4
 µHecklers¶. First broadcast on BBC Radio 4, 8 August, 2007.  
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posed there, as serious practical concerns that arise in human life, remain and there 
are no metaphysical hostages to fortune we might shoot that will make them go away. 
The same is true surely of the considerations that we take to speak to them. With or 
without the metaphysical baggage that the more robust moral realisms wish to import 
into our understandings of morality and that others are happy to discard, war is still 
beastly and murderous, the injustices and cruelties concern for which motivates at 
least our less disreputable resortings to it are still hateful and wicked, the practical 
questions it occasions are still urgent, inecapable and often desperately hard.  
 
3.  
The most HOHJDQWFULWLTXHRIHUURUWKHRU\LQWKHOLWHUDWXUHLVWREHIRXQGLQ³(UURUVDQG
WKH3KHQRPHQRORJ\RI9DOXH´DEULOOLDQWSDSHUE\6LPRQ%ODFNEXUQZULWWHQDOPRVW
years ago and which for a long time I thought had effectively killed error theory off 
until a few years back when the corpse began to twitch again. There Blackburn 
develops a thought experiment which is worth revisiting. He is responding to a rather 
intriguing feature of 0DFNLH¶VEthics, still the locus classicus of error theory. That 
book is in two parts, the first concerned with metaethics, the second with normative 
ethics. Obviously, given what the first part says, it may seem rather surprising that the 
second part exists. It is as if someone were to write a book where, in Part I, she argued 
that astrology is all the rankest, most hopeless nonsense, only to go, in Part II, to 
argue that you can never trust Librans. Clearly, given that Mackie does this he must 
surely think, and I think a close reading of what he says in Part I bears this reading 
out, that while morality, as ordinarily conceived, embodies an error, there is another 
way we could conceive of it that would not.  
Suppose you believe in the reality of moral facts according to some relatively 
metaphysically highfalutin conception of what moral facts are. At least you believe 
this until you read some philosophy and you come thereby to be persuaded that you 
were mistaken. There are no such facts. Morality you come to believe is all false and 
you decide to stop concerning yourself with it. 
But then you go and start reading the papers. And you start noticing certain 
things. You notice for example, that the society in which you are living is one where 
there is a certain amount of violence. People get bullied, abused, raped, beaten up, 
tortured DQGVRPHWLPHVNLOOHG1RZ\RX¶YHJLYHQXSDOOWKDWPRUDOLW\QRQVHQVHDQG
the fancy metaphysics needed to make it true, but you find you have not, for that 
UHDVRQVVWRSSHGFDULQJDERXWWKHIDFWWKDWVWXIIOLNHWKLVJRHVRQ<RXGRQ¶WOLNHWKLV
stuff and you are very pleased that you find yourself living in a community where 
there are rules that prohibit behaviour of this kind so that people who do such things 
can expect to be subject to various restraints and sanctions. You think you would not 
like it if it were proposed that the rules in force in your community should be revised 
LQVXFKDZD\DVWRWROHUDWHWKHVHIRUPVRIYLROHQWEHKDYLRXU<RXGRQ¶WWKLQN\RX
would be willing to accept any revision along those sort of lines. And, as you reflect, 
you may find there are certain other limits to what you feel you would be willing to 
live with where such rules are concerned. Not only do you find yourself reflecting in 
his way about what kind of society you want your society to be, you also find that 
other people are given to doing this. And so you find it can be a very useful activity to 
engage in this activity together, to carry out a long, if intermittent, conversation with 
other members of your community about what the norms that should govern it should 
be.  
Blackburn has a name for what you are doing now. He calls it shmoralizing. 
We can give up moralizing but it is very hard to see, unless we are to simply stop 
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caring about many things presently most important to us, how we might give up 
shmoralizing. So here we are, shmoralizing away long after we ceased more robustly 
to moralize. What we need now of course is a suitable terminology in which to 
shmoralize, a vocabulary apt for the purpose of expressing the thoughts which, in 
shmoralizing we might wish to communicate and share. Conveniently there is one 
available and to hand that looks about perfect. And that is the old, familiar vocabulary 
in which we used to moralize, the old vocabular\RI³JRRG´DQG³ULJKW´DQG³RXJKW´
and so on. So let us shmoralize with that. And now here we are, doing so, and - you 
know what? - ZKDWZHDUHGRLQJQRZGRHVQ¶WKDOIORRNWKHVDPHDVZKDWZHZHUH
GRLQJEHIRUH,QZKLFKFDVH\RXNQRZZKDW"+HUH¶VDEHWWHr hypothesis than we 
started out with about what we were doing before. We were shmoralizing all along. 
Nothing has changed. 
%ODFNEXUQ¶VDQGP\RZQIDYRXUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIERWKPRUDOL]LQJDQG
shmoralizing takes them to be in the business of expressing commitments which are 
fundamentally desire-like rather than belief-like, such as my own unwillingness to 
accept any candidate sets of rules for my community that permit torture, murder or 
rape. Because a state of unwillingness is not a belief, this is not a view that offers any 
hostages to metaphysical fortune. It is nonetheless something I bring with me to the 
table of our normative conversations, something my interlocutors, if they are to 
accord me a certain kind of respect that we perhaps agree in valuing, need to hear and 
engage with. 
 
4 
All this may be contested. Richard Joyce, whose splendid book The Myth of Morality 
is the most thoroughgoing contemporary defence of an error theory, urges that what 
LVDVKHSXWVLW³FRQFHSWXDOO\QRQ-QHJRWLDEOH´DERXWPRrality is the idea that we have 
reasons to do as morality requires, reasons that do not depend on any continent 
features of our desires. This, he argues, necessitates accepting an error theory as he 
accepts the kind of internalism about reasons that Bernard Williams famously 
defended whereby there are no such reasons. Here, for Joyce, is the metaphysical 
hostage to fortune whose execution nothing that deserves to be called morality can 
survive.  
This does not seem at all clear cut to me. Certainly not if the aim is to secure a 
firm dialectical advantage over the kind of expressivism favoured by Blackburn and 
myself. Williams-style internalism about reasons surely draws such plausibility as it 
enjoys from the great difficulty we encounter in making good sense, along robustly 
realist lines, of what an external reason, a reason not contingent on the desire-set of 
the relevant agent happens to be, could possibly be. But the expressivist is well able, it 
seems to me, to make good, if somewhat deflationary, sense of this notion along more 
modest anti-realist lines. That Hitler had a reason to treat Jews better than he did is a 
thought which, as the expressivist construes it, is entirely available to me without 
being hostage to facts about what Hitler may or may not have wanted or desired. To 
this extent, the expressivist can make perfect sense of categorical moral 
requirements.5  
Ambitious, amoral Gyges, protected by his invisibility ring from all possibility 
of discovery and punishment. lacks any internal reason not to do whatever it takes, 
kill, say, to further his interests and ambitions. And yet, Joyce urges, we take morality 
to insist that  Gyges ought not to kill people. ((2001), p. 36) We do indeed but the 
                                                 
5 
See Blackburn (1998), pp. 264Ȃ266, and Gibbard (1990), pp. 160Ȃ164. 
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expressivist can make good sense of what we say when we do so. Gyges nonetheless 
lacks any internal reason to respond to what we say. Given that, while we can indeed 
tell Gyges he ought not to kill people, it might seem a little pointless. There is no 
reason we can offer him that speaks to his concerns, to pay the least attention: our 
disagreement with him is in this sense, fundamental*LYHQWKDWZRXOGQ¶WVD\LQJWKLV 
just be a case of browbeating, a pointless letting of off moral steam.  
Not necessarily. Two points can be made here.6 The first is that we are very 
seldom in a position to know that disagreement is fundamental in this sense. If it 
were, certain kinds of moral address would indeed become pointless and that would 
be a deep problem especially when it happens between us and those we are in the 
business of seeking to live in moral community with. For that reason, I would suggest, 
we are rightly reluctant to draw the pessimistic conclusion that moral address is 
pointless in the way. That we  bother to engage in it where we do ordinarily 
presupposes that it is not thus pointless with the result that such address normally 
carries what we might call the optimistic implicature that it is not. By talking to you at 
all I presuppose that you are not beyond the reach of the considerations I hope to offer 
you to FKDQJH\RXUPLQG7RWKDWH[WHQWWKRVHWRZKRPZHVD\³<RXRXJKWQRWWR
NLOO´SHRSOHDUHDOZD\VOLDEOHWREHSHRSOHZHVXSSRVHKDYHUHDVRQLQGHHGLQWHUQDO
reason, to comply with what we thereby demand of them but the connection is 
pragmatic, not semantic. The second is the much simpler point that the claim that 
Gyges ought not to kill people is not one that we address only to Gyges. When we are 
debating ethics with Gyges on a TV show, it is probably not, or not primarily, Gyges 
we are trying to reach but other, less unreachable, people we can be more confident of 
addressing without browbeating.  
Something very close to the first of these points is made by Stephen Finlay in 
KLVH[FHOOHQWSDSHU³7KH(UURULQWKH(UURU7KHRU\´0RVWPRUDOGLVFRXUVH)LQOD\
cODLP³WDNHVSODFHEHWZHHQSHRSOHZKRVKDUHWKHLUIXQGDPHQWDOPRUDOYDOXHVDQG
DVVXPHWKDWWKH\VKDUHWKHVHYDOXHV´ ((2008), p. 356) This claim has been contested 
by Jonas Olson who responds that Finlay: 
 
underestimates the prevalence of fundamental moral disagreement in moral 
current societies. Even a cursory glance at public political debate in many 
countries will reveal fundamental disagreement between conservatives and 
feminists; socialists and neoliberals; cosmopolitans and nationalists; and so on. 
((2011), p. 72) 
 
A little finessing is in order here. Talk of µIXQGDPHQWDOGLVDJUHHPHQW¶ can mean two 
WKLQJV,WFDQPHDQZKDWSHUKDSVGLVDJUHHPHQWLQRQH¶VIXQGDPHQWDOEHOLHIVLQWKH
sense in which the hedonists belief in the value of pleasure is her fundamental belief, 
the belief at the ground floor of her ethical outlook. It can also mean disagreement 
that is fundamental in the sense in which neither party has any internal reason to come 
URXQGWRWKHRWKHU¶VYLHZ2UZHPLJKWVD\ZKHUHQRFKDQJHLQHLWKer parties moral 
EHOLHIVWKDWZRXOGFRXQWDVDQLPSURYHPHQWE\WKDWSDUW\¶VRZQOLJKWVZRXOGVXIILFH
to eliminate the disagreement.7 Disagreement that is fundamental in the former sense 
need not be fundamental in the latter. (What is fundamental in the order of 
explanation is not always fundamental in the order of justification.) While the quoted 
sentence from Finlay may suggest the former sense, it¶VWKHODWWHUWKDWLVVXUHO\
                                                 
6
 These points are, I think, available not only to the expressivist, but to other deflationary 
reconstructions of morality such as that favoured by Finlay (2008). 
7
 This is the sense of fundamental disagreement at issue in Egan (2007). 
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important here. It is where disagreement is fundamental in this sense that address risks 
becoming pointless. But in this sense, it is often almost impossible to know that 
disagreement is fundamental. In this sense disagreement is fundamental when it 
persists even in ideal conditions and conditions are never ideal or near enough for us 
to make a confident diagnosis that this is the case. Thus, very evidently, in the moral 
disagreements that vex current society, moral disgreement is typically deeply 
entangled with factual disagreement, that the full information implicit in most 
understandings of ideal circumstances would in principle iron out with who can say 
what results. Thus conservatives and feminists may disagree about the plasticity of 
human nature and the extent to which supposed gender differences between men and 
women are learned or socially constructed as opposed to µQDWXUDO¶hardwired and 
innate; socialists and neoconservatives disagree over the extent to which the pursuit 
by states of egalitarian economic policies can at once keep us prosperous and avoid 
the murderous authoritarianism that has poisoned too many twentieth century 
experiments in socialism. And many of our deepest moral disagreements with each 
other, on questions such as abortion or sexuality, are closely bound up with deep 
factual disagreements about theology. So cases where we can be remotely confident 
that the optimistic implicature fails are, in practice, decidedly rare.  
I am doubtful that conceptual analysis of moral language will deliver the result 
Joyce wants. Following both Blackburn and Joyce I suspect that what is crucial is not 
the rather obscure question of what is conceptually non-negotiable so much as one of 
what is indispensable in our practice and especially of the features of it that lead us to 
value it.  
(Others might be less inclined to emphasize questions of conceptual analysis 
and more concerned with empirical investigation of how ordinary users of moral 
concepts, the proverbial men on Clapham omnibuses or, as we have come to call 
them, the Folk, understand their moral practice. Some interest might perhaps attach to 
WKHVWXG\RIWKLVVRUWRI)RON0HWDHWKLFV%XW,PXVWFRQIHVVP\VHOI,GRQ¶Wmuch 
care what the Folk think.  
 
Why should I? Compare the philosophy of mathematics. Here we have an area of 
discourse that raises deep and difficult philosophical vexations, that is puzzling in 
FRXQWOHVVGHHSDQGGLIILFXOWZD\V7KHSKLORVRSKHU¶VWDVNLVWRILQGVRPHZD\RI
understanding it whereby it makes sense. That test, whether we do make sense of it, is 
the important one. What the folk think is neither here nor there. If someone says, 
Listen, I think number talk is talk about higher-order classes, ZHGRQ¶WWHVWWKDWRXWE\
asking Granny, checking her change in Tesco, what she thinks of it. Like almost all 
the philosophically untutored, she can be relied on to respond to any such quizzing 
ZLWKDEODQNVWDUH6RIRONWKHRU\GRHVQ¶WLQWHUHVWPHDQGVKRXOGQ¶W,ZRXOGVXEPLW
much interest you. Folk practice is another thing. Granny is just hopeless at 
philosophy but she is pretty hot when it comes to checking her change. She thinks if 
her shopping cost two pounds 16 pence and she hands over a fiver , she should be 
getting two pounds 84 pence back from the cashier. That, and other truths of simple 
arithmetic, represents an appearance we would mark any theory in philosophy of 
mathematics down sharply for failing to save. Again, as with mathematics, so with 
ethics. We seek a philosophical gloss on our practice that will make it intelligible to 
us. The practice we seek thus to illuminate should be the one familiar to us from 
everyday experience. The theory can be news.8)  
                                                 
8
 Not for the first time, I echo Blackburn. See his (1993), pp. 150-151. 
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5 
Joyce distinguishes three directions the error theorist could go. One is abolitionism 
ZKLFKOLNHPHKHUHMHFWV7KHVHFRQGLVWRDGRSWRUUHFRPPHQGWKHSROLF\³ZKHUH
moral beliefs are (somehow) believed, despite the fact that evidence of the falsity of 
VXFKEHOLHIVLVJODULQJ´9. This policy, which he tentatively labels propagandism, he 
rejects, VHQVLEO\RQWKHJURXQGVWKDW³1RSROLF\WKDWHQFRXUDJHVWKHEHOLHILQ
falsehoods, or the promulgation of false beliefs in others, will be practically stable in 
WKHORQJUXQ´7KDWOHDYHVWKHSROLF\³ZKHUHLW>LHPRUDOLW\@LVDGRSWHGDVDILFWLRQ´
or fictionalism as he calls it. This kind of fictionalism, fictionalism as a policy 
recommendation, as a view of what our moral thought, suitably purged of error, might 
properly come to be, is sometimes called revolutionary fictionalism, though I myself 
prefer the less cumbersome prescriptive fictionalism.  
I find prescriptive fictionalism an odd and implausible view. Joyce conceives 
it as a kind of make-believe, where, while we know, especially in our reflective 
moments that morality is contaminated with error, we reinforce our motivation to 
behave morally by pretending to ourselves that moral requirements have the 
categorical force we know them to lack, much as, as his own central analogy has it, 
someone might pretend that they must adhere religiously to an exercise regime, fifty 
press-ups, not one less, every single day, where in fact the odd lapse is quite harmless 
in itself, but where I fear I risk falling into a habit of letting myself off lightly that 
might set me down a ³VOLSSHU\VORSHWRLQDFWLYLW\´ ((2001), p. 215.). Even in the 
H[HUFLVHFDVHLW¶VKDUGWREHFRQYLQFHG,QHHGGRDQ\pretending here. Can¶W I just 
motivate my sticking religiously to my regime by reflecting on the dangers of heading 
down a slippery slope to inactivity? In the moral case, it seems less convincing still, 
partly for reasons Joyce himself acknowledges. In his favourite example of Gyges, he 
allows that Gyges is certainly not going to adopt his fiction. But while Gyges will not 
JLYHDKRRWIRU-R\FH¶VILFWLRQZHKLVPRUHYLUWXRXVIHOORZFLWL]HQV will, he suggests 
appeal to it in justifying to ourselves the measures we take to protect ourselves from 
Gyges and others like him by, for example, putting them in prison. But this seems 
entirely unsatisfactory. What we FDQ¶WGRHYHQDUPHGZLWKRXUILFWLRQLQRIIHUGyges 
an internal reason why he should desist from killing people. Fictionalism is no help 
here. ((2001), pp. 221-222) What we can do, armed with our fiction, is offer each 
other excellent reasons to take the steps we do to protect ourselves from him. The 
trouble is, as Joyce again acknowledges, that we can do this perfectly well without a 
fiction. We had excellent, non±fictional reasons to do this all along. ((2001), pp. 222-
223) None of which to is to mention the obvious worries about the strange 
schizophrenia involYHGLQDGRSWLQJ-R\FH¶VILFWLRQDOLVWSURSosal. If we imagine 
ourselves pretend very effectively, so we are fooled by our own make-believe, 
fictionalism of course shades off into propagandism. If the pretencHLVZHDNHULW¶V
hard to see how it will help us much when the stakes are at all high except insofar as 
we remind ourselves of the urgency of the reasons we had to adopt it. And then, as 
with the exercise case, it all starts to look rather unnecessary. And it is baffling, to say 
the least, how we might envisage, say, moral education in a fictionalist moral 
community: /LVWHQFKLOGUHQ\RXPXVWQ¶WWHOOOLHVRUEXOO\HDFKRWKHUor be mean and 
you must be kind to your parents etc., but actually none of these things is really true. 
 
                                                 
9This and the following quotation, Joyce (2001),  p. 214. I have corrected what I think must be a minor 
typographical error in the published text.  
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We find another influential defence of prescriptive fictionalism in a paper by 
Daniel  Nolan, Greg Restall and Caroline :HVW³0RUDO)LFWLRQDOLVP9HUVXVWKH
5HVW´6XFKILFWionalism, they contend, is an especially promising way understanding 
how an improved and reformed moral discourse might be understood. The proposal 
takes various forms but the core idea is that there is a thing called the morality fiction, 
understood roughly as the untrue story moral realists believe, much as the fiction in 
modal fictionalism is roughly the untrue story modal realists believe. This story is 
untrue but the fictionalist policy is that we stick to it as a sort of useful pretence. 
Nolan, Restall and West find this idea promising but in often ways that seem 
baffling on close inspection. Thus they suggest that prescriptive fictionalism scores 
over expressivism by avoiding the Frege-Geach Problem. This is far from clearly 
correct.10 That it is true in the fiction that p and that it is true in the fiction that if p 
then q do not entail that it is true in the fiction that q.  If I believe that p and believe 
that if p then q, logic requires me to believe that q. But if I pretend that p and pretend 
that if p then q, logic dRHVQ¶WUHTXLUHPHWRGRDQ\WKLQJGiven that fictions are not in 
the market for truth, why should only consistent fictions be eligible? The fictionalist 
can no more just help himself to the thought that this game of make-believe is subject 
to the logic regimentation we impose on ordinary beliefs and assertions than the 
expressivist can help himself to a like thought about the noncognitive attitudes he 
takes our moral utterances to express. Nolan, Restall and West might hope to pre-
empt this concern by writing:  
 
The combined theory of base discourse, bridge principles, and fiction has a 
uniform interpretation. As a result, the combined theory is closed under logical 
consequence. ((2005), p. 314) 
 
But this is not something they can simply announce any more than the quasi-realist 
can dissolve the Frege-Geach problem by kindred announcements. They have to 
motivate LWDQGWKH\GRQ¶W 
They further suggest that prescriptive fictionalism makes moral epistemology 
straightfoward. If we are wondering whether, say, euthanasia, is wrong, that tricky 
question becomes readily tractable as simply an inquiry as to what the fiction says. 
((2005), p. 316) But how is that inquiry tractable? Where am I to find this fiction? It is 
not in the catalogue of my own, or any other library. If we understand it, on the model 
of modal fictionalism, as the story moral realists believe is true, that helps not at all, 
for that story as such is a story simply about metaethics, quite silent about the answers 
to substantive normative ethical questions. And if fictionalism fails to make good 
sense of how we might answer such a question, it makes it harder still to understand 
why we should care about it. If the moral fiction is just that, a fiction, who cares what 
it says? And yet we do care, we care a lot, about when it is OK to go to war, about 
whether euthanasia is always wrong and a host of other vexatious moral conundrums. 
Nolan, Restall and West help us a bit with this difficulty. Posing the question, 
which of the many possible moral fictions we should adopt as the focus of our make-
believe, they suggest we settle the issue by inquiring which fiction is would be most 
useful to adopt, where this, they want to say, is a pragmatic, not a moral question. 
((2005), p. 327; see also p. 322) Of course it had better not be a moral question. If our 
reason for adopting some particular fiction, is itself part of the fiction, and as such, 
just more garbage, then it is no reason at all. But it is natural to wonder what 
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³SUDJPDWLF´PHDQVKHUH:KDWVRUWRIXVHfulness does the most useful fiction enjoy. Is 
it usefulness to me, Lenman, that is of interest, or maybe usefulness to Nolan, Restall 
and West? If so, this is not going to furnish a very plausible rationale for any fiction 
that is very recognizably moral. If, on the other hand, our ideal of usefulness is shaped 
by some constraint that it be suitably impartial then the claim that this is an ideal that 
stands apart from morality, starts to look a little strained. 
/HW¶VVORZWKLVGRZQDELWWRWU\WRPDNHP\point clearer. Fictionalism, we 
might suppose, offers us three things. Thing one, lets say is a set of rules that might be 
DGRSWHGWRJRYHUQVRPHPRUDOFRPPXQLW\VXFKDVRXURZQ/HW¶VFDOOWKLVVHWRIUXOHV
51RZ5GRHVQ¶WOHW¶VVXSSRVHKDYHDQ\GHVFULptive content at all. We can think of 
it just as a set of sentences in the imperative mood, orders, commands, not statements 
or assertions and so not something questions about whose truth or falsity even arise. 
:HWKHQKDYHDILFWLWLRXVPRUDOFODLPOHW¶Vsuppose, call it FC short for Fictitious 
Claim. FC here is the claim that it is morally right for a society to adopt these rules 
DQGIRULWVPHPEHUVWRIROORZWKHP)&FRPELQHVZLWK5OHW¶VVXSSRVHWRJLYHD
PRUDOILFWLRQ),W¶VIDOVHEHFDXVHWKHRQO\VWatement it contains, FC, is a statement 
about what it is morally right for people to do and, the fictionalist holds, all such 
claims are false. Finally there is a non-fictitious claim, call it TC, True Claim. TC 
says that because these rules are the most useful set we might adopt, presumably on 
VRPHSURSHUO\LPSDUWLDOVHQVHRI³XVHIXO´WKLVSDUWLFXODUILFWLRQ)LVWKHILFWLRQIRUXV 
,KRSHLW¶VREYLRXVZK\WKDWLVKRSHOHVV:KDWPDNHVLWhopeless is the 
complete redundancy of the fictitious claim FC, On a simpler and more economical 
picture we have only R and TC. That is, we have a particular set of rules and we have 
the thought that, because this set of rules is in some suitable sense, optimal, they are 
the rules for us. Of course this is no longer a form of fictionalism or a metaethical 
theory of any sort. What it is is just a normative ethical theory and an extremely 
familiar one. What it is is just rule consequentialism. If the smart, the wise, the good 
things for us as a society to do is to adopt the set of rules that will be impartially 
optimific, then we can just go ahead and adopt those rules and try to live by them. We 
GRQ¶WQHHGWRGRVRPHWKLQJHOVHLQDGGLWLRQLQWKHZD\RIDWWHPSWLQJVRPHEL]DUUH
psychological confidence trick of pretending something is true of this set of rules that 
we know is not, namely that following them is morally right as that concept is 
understood in terms of some robustly realist metaethical theory we do not believe.  
,IZHDFFHSW-R\FH¶VGLDJQRVLVWKDWHUURUWKHRU\OHDYHs us with three options, 
abolitionism, propagandism and fictionalism and if we accept my diagnosis that we 
have excellent reason to reject all these options, then we may legitimately conclude 
that we have excellent reason to continue to moralize, and need fall into no errors as 
we do so. Moral discourse is the conversation we about what the rules and standards 
we want to have govern the society in which we live. This is something we have 
H[FHOOHQWUHDVRQVWREHFRQFHUQHGDERXWUHDVRQVZHKDYHQ¶WPDGHXSDQd that do not 
rest on any metaphysical confusion. Sometimes we think there must be more than 
that, that our moral commitments must represent some independent reality. 
Sometimes we confuse morality with this fantasy about its status and imagine that, in 
debunking the latter we have debunked the former. But we have not  The central 
relevant fact about human beings, needing no metaphysical baggage to shore it up, is 
that most of us want very much to live together in a social world governed by shared 
norms of decency, honesty, mutual respect, FRPSDVVLRQDQGIDLUQHVV6ROHW¶V 
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